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Who Failed to Go Public with 
Best Efforts Offerings
Sung-Il Cho
This paper presents evidence on the failed initial public offerings that used best 
efforts contracts. Out of 732 best efforts IPOs attempted in 1980-84, 186 IPOs 
(about one fourth) failed to meet minimum sales requirement and were subse­
quently withdrawn. Offerings with greater uncertainty about their true value 
failed more frequently. The failure rate was not significantly different between 
“all or none” type offerings and “minimum and maximum” type offerings. 
Regional investment bankers managed the most of best efforts IPOs and the 
average underpricing of their offerings was smaller than that of offerings man­
aged by submajor bracket investment bankers. It is noteworthy that bankers 
with a record of failed offerings did not seem to lose their future business and 
relatively small issuing firms continued to rely on these bankers to go public.
I, INTRODUCTION
The underpricing of initial public equity offerings (IPOs) has become a well 
known phenomenon to many financial researchers. Ibbotson, Sindelar, and 
Ritter [9] report that the average initial return is 16.4% for 8,668 IPOs dur­
ing the 1960-86 period. Although the magnitude of average underpricing 
is far greater for best efforts IPOs, most theoretical and empirical studies 
have focused on firm commitment IPO s} While firm commitment offer­
ings are more common for both seasoned and unseasoned new issues, best 
efforts offerings have provided an important financing alternative, espe­
cially for small firms, in the IPO market.
The purpose of this paper is to better understand the pricing environ­
ment for best efforts IPOs, which is quite different from that for firm com­
mitment IPOs. The distinction between the two contract types that we 
choose to explore here is the possibility  ^of failure of an IPO. With a firm 
commitment contract, the underwriter guarantees the success of the offer­
ing by promising to take up any unsold shares. Still, the attempt to go public
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may fail if the  offering is canceled even before th e  issuer an d  th e  u n d e r ­
w riter agree on  the final offer price  to m ake the  o ffering  effective. However, 
once the offering becom es effective, th e  issuer is assured to  receive the  n e t 
proceeds from  the underw riter.
In contrast, with a best efforts contract, the underwriter will withdraw 
the offering if the number of shares subscribed by investors does not reach 
the minimum sales requirement during the selling period.^ If this hap­
pens, the issuer receives no proceeds from the underwriter and no public 
market is created for its shares after a long and expensive registration and 
selling process. The failure of an IPO would have a significant wealth effect 
on both the issuer and the underwriter The issuer will not be able to diver­
sify its wealth through the public capital market or may lose profitable 
investment opportunities due to the lack of alternative financing. In addi­
tion, the firm's proprietary information may have been revealed to the pub­
lic including its com petitors and a significant m anagerial time and 
expenses are wasted. On the other hand, the underwriter receives no com­
pensation for its selling efforts and expenses. Also, the underwriter may 
lose a part of its reputation capital by having underwritten a failed offering.
In this paper, we provide an empirical evidence on the failed best 
efforts IPOs. While it is known that best efforts offerings can fail, it is not 
well documented how often IPOs actually fail, what kind of issuing firms 
fail, and which investment bankers underwrite such failed IPOs.^ If the 
possibility of failure is not trivial as this study shows, issuing firms using best 
efforts contracts need to prepare for the possible consequences from the 
failure. The choice between firm commitment and best efforts contracts 
may also be affected by this possibility of failure with a best efforts offering. 
The information on the characteristics of failed offerings may help poten­
tial issuing firms to check if it is the right time for them to go public. In 
choosing the underwriter, they may want to investigate not only the after­
market performance of its successful offerings but also the record of its 
failed offerings. For researchers, if the probability of failure and its wealth 
effect is significant, the possibility of failure should be addressed in model­
ing the pricing and contract choice decision of issuing firms.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II discusses the 
theories on the failure of best efforts IPOs. Section III provides evidence 
on the frequency of failure and the characteristics of failed best efforts IPOs. 
The relationship between the failure rate and the minimum sales require­
ment is investigated. The characteristics of investment bankers who man­
aged failed IPOs are also provided. The implication of the findings for 
firms using best efforts contracts is discussed. Section IV contains conclud­
ing remarks.
64 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 3(1)1993
II. THEORIES ON THE IPO FAILURE
Most existing theories on the IPO underpricing are based on the setting of 
firm commitment offerings. They do not exphcitly consider the possibility 
of a failure and, as a result, do not provide testable implications about the 
IPO failure.
Ritter [11] proposes that some issuers choose best efforts contracts to 
avoid severe underpricing that would be required in firm commitment 
offerings to compensate uninformed investors against adverse allocation 
bias. In a best efforts offering, an issuer commits itself to withdraw the 
offering if minimum sales requirement (henceforth, MSR) is not reached 
due to the lack of informed investors' participation. This commitment of 
withdrawal is more valuable to those more risky issuers for which required 
underpricing without the MSR would be too high. Ritter [11] shows that 
there exists a riskiness threshold above which more risky issuers find it opti­
mal to trade an increased probability of failure for a reduction in underpric­
ing, choosing best efforts offerings over firm commitment offerings. Welch
[16] extends Ritter's model to argue that the more risky issuers set higher 
MSRs, risking a higher probability of failure.
Benveniste and Spindt [3] model that an underwriter underprices to 
induce its regular investors to reveal their private valuations of IPOs truth­
fully during the preselling period. With the guarantee of net proceed 
under a firm commitment contract, the underwriter has the incentive to 
presell the entire issue, which would increase the required underpricing. 
•While the underwriter's incentive to presell the entire issue could be 
reduced under a best efforts contract, they recognize that the MSR tends to 
reactivate its preselling incentive. Welch [16] interprets this to imply that a 
best efforts offerings with a higher MSR, which requires more pre-selling 
activity, would be underpriced more. This in turn implies that the proba­
bility of failure for offerings with higher MSRs would be lower. Further­
more, the probability of failure for “all or none” type offerings, which would 
require pre-selling of the entire issue, is expected to be zero.
Signaling by underpricing models such as Allen and Faulhaber [1], 
Grinblatt and Hwang [6], and Welch [15] propose that the issuer under­
prices an IPO to signal its quality and benefits from the signal on the sub­
sequent seasoned offerings. Since the issuer quality is revealed after the 
IPO in their models, the IPO will not fail in their pooling equilibrium. 
Cho [5] extends Welch [15] to explain the pricing of best efforts IPOs, 
assuming that the issuer quality and hence its true value is revealed with a 
positive probability at the IPO. Given that the offering may fail if the 
issuer quality is revealed and the offer price is set too high, the issuer
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attempts to optimize between the underpricing and the probabiUty of fail­
ure. If the probability of revelation is sufficiently high due to small ex ante 
uncertainty, high-quality issuers will be able to achieve a separating equi­
librium by setting the offer price lower than its true price, but higher than 
the average pooling price. However, beyond the certain level of uncer­
tainty, underpricing required to separate themselves becomes too exces­
sive for high-quality issuers and a pooling equilibrium results. Cho [5] 
shows that, only in this pooling equilibrium, low-quality issuers find it 
optimal to overprice to mimic high-quality issuers and fail with a positive 
probability.
Welch [17] analyzes the effect of sequential subscription decision by 
investors on the pricing of IPOs. The observability of subscription deci­
sions of earlier investors can lead to “cascade” effects, in which later inves­
tors rely completely on the decisions of earlier investors and ignore their 
own information. As a consequence, if a few early investors believe that 
the offering is overpriced, they can swamp the information held by other 
investors and doom the offerings to fail. Or, if a few early investors believe 
that the offering is underpriced, they can create almost unlimited demand 
for the issue. With cascade effects, issuers with bad inside information 
choose the full subscription price that eliminates the possibility of failure. 
Welch [17] shows that issuers with good, not bad, inside information set 
the price above this full subscription price and occasionally fail.
III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FAILED 
BEST EFFORTS IPO.
The data used in this study consist of 2,183 IPOs which became effective 
from October 1, 1980 to September 31, 1984 in the United States."^ A 
“failed/PO” is defined as one whose registration became effective and failed 
to go public with that registration. There cannot be a failed IPO with a firm 
commitment contract by definition, for its success is guaranteed once it is 
declared effective by the setting of the final offer price. Offerings that were 
canceled before they even became effective are excluded from our data set. 
For these canceled IPOs, we could not determine why each offering was can­
celed or how close each offering was to becoming effective before it was can­
celed. Thus, a failed (best efforts) IPO occurs when the issuer and the 
investment banker have failed to sell the MSR specified in the prospectus. 
Failed offerings were identified with the help of the data base compiled by 
Going Public: The IPO Reporter. Successful offerings were identified by the 
data base of Ritter [10], augmented to include offerings from 1983 to 1984, 
which was generously made available to us.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for IP O s  by Contract Type in the Period 1980-1984  
(Standard Deviation in Parenthesis)
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Successful best 
efforts offerings




Average gross proceeds^ $2,443,637.** $2,951,086.** $14,932,215.
(2,381,499.) (2,880,535.) (25,433,464.)
Average pre-offer book value of $383,160.** $101,864.** $10,819,814.
equity (829,828.) (787,207.) (44,525,421.)
Average sales in year prior to offer $503,102. $477,446. $40,634,986.
(1,703,756.) (992,759.) (147,773,139.)
Average net income in year prior to -58,204.** -139,470.** c
offer (269,816.) (309,127.)
Average offer price $3.08 $1.61 $17.86
(32.11) (2.08) (156.87)
Average offering fraction*^ 40.48%* 43.44%* 34.37%
(16.93) (20.00) (15.45)
Number o f firms 546 186 1451
Notes:  ^All o f the averages (gross proceeds, book value, sales, net income, offer price) are averages of 
nominal values; no price level adjustments have been made. Gross proceeds are calculated by 
multiplying the maximum number of shares proposed in the prospectus by the offer price.
 ^Offering fraction represents the maximum number of shares proposed as a percentage of 
total number of shares to be outstanding after a successful offering.
 ^Due to the difficulty in data collection, average net income is not available for firm commit­
ment offerings.
 ^All the means of descriptiove statistics are different at any conventional level of significance 
between firm commitment IPOs and best efforts IPOs. Between successful and failed best 
efforts IPOs, means with superscripts “**” and are different at the 1% and 5% significance 
levels, respectively.
Data source for failed offerings: Howard and Company, Going Public: The IPO Reporter.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the 2,183 firms that attempted 
to go public in 1980-1984. Table 1 shows that firms using firm commitment 
contracts are less severely underpriced and are substantially larger in gross 
proceed, book value of equity, sales, net income, and offer price which are 
frequently used as the proxies for ex ante price uncertainty of IPOs.^ 
Among best efforts offerings, firms whose offerings failed are, on average, 
smaller in all proxy variables except for proposed gross proceed than firms 
that succeeded. Several of firm commitment and best efforts offerings were 
offered at a price higher than $100 as a unit which is a combination of 
stocks and warrants. It is interesting to note that failed offerings proposed 
greater gross proceed than successful ones, despite their smaller average 
book value of equity, annual sales or net income. It may be because they
offered a greater fraction of their equity to the public than successful offer­
ings (43.4% against 40.5%). However, the difference in average gross pro­
ceed is greater than can be explained by the difference in their average 
offering fractions if we use book value of equity as a reasonable proxy for 
the market value of equity. This suggests that failed offerings, on average, 
attempted to sell a greater fraction of their equity at a higher valuation than 
successful offerings. Overall, Table 1 suggests that failed best efforts offer­
ings were made more frequently by firms with greater uncertainty about 
their true value.
The fact that the true price for failed offerings is not available make it 
difficult, if not impossible, to directly test implications of Ritter [11], Welch
[17] or Cho [5] about IPO failure. Given that a reasonable proxy for the 
quality of inside information is not readily available, it is difficult to test 
whether failed offerings were made by low-quality issuers as in Cho [5] or 
by issuers with good inside information as in Welch [17]. However, all three 
models imply that issuers with greater ex ante price uncertainty, due to 
either greater inherent risks or considerable inside information, are more 
likely to choose to risk failure. If the proxy variables that we choose are ade­
quate proxy for the uncertainty, we would expect that the uncertainty would 
be smaller for successful offerings than for failed offerings.
To test the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the 
failure rate and the uncertainty, we estimate the following logit success-like- 
lihood model:
^ ( i)  =  1/[1 -I- e x p ( a o - a iX i i - a 2 ^ 2 i ) ] >
Where j!?(i) is the probability that the *th issue will succeed and Xji and 
X2i are annual net income and book value of equity for the ith issue, respec­
tively. Note that the uncertainty is smaller, the larger the value of net 
income or book value. We expect the proxy variables to have positive coef­
ficients, given that the probability of success is greater for offerings with 
smaller uncertainty. The estimated coefficients of three versions of the logit 
model are presented in Table 2 together with their ^-ratios and the likeli- 
hood-ratio statistics. The estimated coefficients have the correct signs and 
are statistically significant. They indicate that issuers with larger annual net 
income and/or book value of equity were more likely to succeed, which is 
consistent with Ritter [11], Welch [17], or Cho [5].
In addition to the minimum sales requirement, all best efforts offer­
ings specify the maximum number of shares that can be sold if the offering 
is oversubscribed. In an “all or none” type offering, this maximum is set 
equal to the MSR. Other offerings set the maximum greater than the MS/?,
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Table 2
Estimates from Logit Success-Likelihood ModeP 
jbW = 1/[1 + exp(ao - a 1^ 1 i - a2-^ 2i)] ^
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Estimated Parameters
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant -1.196** -1.270** -1.089**
(-11.58) (-13.48) (-11.96)
Annual Net Income 0.955** 1.170**
(2.60) (3.41)
Book Value o f Equity 0.275* 0.465**
(1.59) (2.60)
Likelihood-Ratio Statistic 15.62** 12.54** 9.46**
0.583 0.582 0.582
Notes:  ^The ^ratios (coefficient/standard error) are reported in parentheses. For 
large samples, the Oration is distributed as the ^-distribution. All three 
models are estimated with a sample size of 724 offerings.
 ^ is equal to one if the offering succeeds and zero if the offering fails.
* Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.
which we will call “minimum and maximum” type offerings. Welch [16] 
interprets Ritter [11] to imply that issuers with greater uncertainty choose 
higher MSR to alleviate excessive underpricing that would have been 
required otherwise, risking a higher probability of failure. Using a data set 
similar to ours, Welch concludes the evidence to not favor Ritter's hypoth­
esis that the uncertainty is an important positive determinant oiM SR.
Our data provides a similar evidence. Given that the standard 
assumptions to run an ordinary least square regression are often not satis­
fied, we do not report the results of regressions. Instead, we divide our sam­
ple into five groups based on the ratio of minimum against the maximum. 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for best efforts oflFerings categorized by 
this ratio, which shows no clear pattern between the ratio and any of the 
proxy variables for uncertainty. F-statistic shows that means of all three 
proxy variables are not different among the five groups of different ratios 
at five percent significance level. Also, none of the coefficients for all three 
proxy variables in a multiple regression equation with the ratio as the 
dependent variable is significant.
In addition, our data shows that the failure rate is not significantly dif­
ferent between the “all or none” type offerings and the “minimum and 
maximum” type offerings, 24.4% and 24.2%, respectively. This is not con­
sistent with Ritter [11] that higher MSRs increase the probability that the 
offering will fail due to lower (informed) demand. This is not supportive of
the implication of Benveniste and Spindt [3] that the failure rate would be 
lower for offerings with a higher which requires more pre-selling activ­
ity. Furthermore, the failure rate is not close to zero for “all or none” type 
offerings in which investment bankers are expected to presell the entire 
issue in their model. For the “minimum and maximum” type offerings, the 
average ratio of minimum to maximum is 62.4% for successful offerings 
and 58.7% for failed offerings. The difference in the average ratios is not 
statistically significant.^
Welch [16] interprets Benveniste and Spindt [3] to yield the implica­
tion that offerings with higher MSRs, which requires more preselling activ­
ity, would be underpriced more. Welch reports the evidence that supports 
the positive relationship between MSR and IPO underpricing (the is 
about 5%). However, Table 3 does not show a significant positive relation­
ship between MSR and IPO underpricing. The coefficient of OLS regres­
sion equation of underpricing on MSR have a positive sign, but not 
significant at any conventional level (the is about 0.1%). As noted by 
Welch [16], preselling activities are not common among best efforts IPOs. 
We believe that models based on preselling activity including Benveniste 
and Spindt [3] is less applicable to best efforts IPOs that does not usually 
involve pre-selling activity.
It would be interesting to know which investment bankers brought 
these failed offerings to the IPO market. Hayes [8] classified investment 
bankers into four groups in descending order of strength within the indus­
try; special bracket, major bracket, submajors, and others. Based on the 
location in “tombstone advertisements,” we classified all leading and co­
leading investment bankers into three groups: majors (which includes spe­
cial bracket), submajors, and regional investment bankers.^
The characteristics of offerings underwritten by different groups of 
investment bankers are reported in Table 4. Four hundred and thirty dif­
ferent investment bankers served as lead or co-lead for the 2,183 offerings. 
For 732 best efforts offerings attempted, 686 offerings were handled by a 
single lead, with only 43 using tsvo lead underwriters and three using three 
underwriters. On the other hand, for 1,451 firm commitment offerings, 
1,032 offerings were handled by a single lead, with 349 using two lead 
underwriters and the remaining 70 using three to five underwriters. This 
suggests that investment bankers' attempt to share the risks with other 
investment bankers is more prominent in a firm commitment offering than 
in a best efforts offering.
Table 4 shows that major group bankers seldom use a best efforts con­
tract: only three best efforts offerings out of 737 total offerings in which 
they served as lead or co-lead underwriters, all of which succeeded. Best
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m i e  3
Failure Rate for Best Efforts IPOs by the Minimum Sales Requirement in 
the Period 1980-1984 (Standard Deviation in Parenthesis)













:a- 0 < r < 0.5 33 -34 -218 386 64 598 -48 164 32.9%
iv. (34.0%) (496) (377) (806) (2866) (260) (512) (64.2)
ns 0.5 < r < 0.6 32 -111 -164 571 111 345 -50 598 39.3
(22.4) (1459) (358) (921) (1023) (142) (1679) (70.2)
)ii' 0.6 < r < 0.75 40 165 -72 615 110 257 -92 640 25.9
(26.7) (310) (284) (1370) (570) (236) (1835) (64.8)
lot
by
0.75 < r <  1.0 30 295 -155 373 131 355 -89 400 39.2
(18.6) (872) (251) (961) (770) (266) (1171) (73.2)
r = 1.0 42 172 -108 310 130 238 -12 373 57.6
A (24.4) (379) (265) (856) (500) (368) (1265) (98.0)
sie1 Total‘S 177 102 -139 451 546 383 -58 503 39.6%
if (24.5%) (787) (309) (1011) (830) (270) (1704) (77.1)
Notes: ® All o f the means are averages o f nominal values in thousands of US dollars; no price level 
adjustments have been made. For variable definitions, refer to Table 1.
 ^Failure rate is calculated by dividing the number of failed offerings by the number of failed 
oiBFerings and successful oflFerings.
 ^Initial return is calculated as (PT/OP - 1) x 100%, where PT is the first recorded closing bid 
price and OP is the offer price. For National Market System and American and New York 
Exchange Securities, the first recorded closing transaction price is used, rather than the clos­
ing bid price.
 ^The minimum sales requirement is missing for nine failed offerings. These nine offerings 
were excluded from the table.
 ^F statistic shows that means of all three variables (Book, Net Income, Sales) are not different 
among the five groups at 5% significance level. Using Ratio as the dependent variable, coeffi­
cients for all three variables in a multiple regression equation are not significant at 5% level.
efforts contracts are not widely used by the submajor group either: fifty-four 
best efforts offerings out of 814 total offerings in which they served as lead 
or co-lead underwriters, 13 of which failed. Most best efforts oflFerings were 
managed by regional investment bankers. However, the failure rate is about 
the same between submajors and regional bankers.
The average underpricing is significantly smaller for firm commitment 
offerings than for best efforts offerings, consistent with previous findings. 
Table 4 also shows that the average underpricing for firm commitment offer­
ings is smaller for investment bankers with greater reputation (or strength)
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for IPOs By Underwriter Group in the Period 1980-1984 
(Standard Deviation in Parenthesis)




group Cases^ Proceeds Book Cases Proceeds Book Return Cases Proceeds Book Return
Majors 0 3 18,300 3,206 42.8 536 29,716 25,364 5.5
(20,813) (3,249) (93.5) (36,577) (70,324) (14.2)
Submajors 13 2,765 133 40 3,135 383 53.6 588 6,578 2,712 11.9
(1,086) (404) (2,124) (433) (92.3) (5,299) (5,848) (28.2)
Regional 173 2,965 100 503 2,308 355(774 38.8 327 5,636 1,259 18.7
(2,973) (809) (1,605) ) (76.4) (7,358) (3,097) (47.9)
Total 186 2,951(2, 103 546 2,444 383 39.9 1,451 14,932 10,820 11.1
881) (787) (2,381) (830) (77.6) (25,433) (44,525) (30.6)
Notes:
 ^All of the means are averages o f nominal values in thousands of US dollars; no price level 
adjustments have been made. For variable definitions, refer to Table 1 and Table 3.
 ^The number of cases are based on the count o f the lead underwriter. If an offering is 
managed by more than one underwriter, it is counted as if it is underwritten by an 
investment banker of a higher group (or ranking).
 ^All the means of descriptive statistics except Initial Return are different at any conventional 
level of significance between firm commitment IPOs and best efforts IPOs. Between 
successful and failed IPOs, however, they are not different at 5% significance level.
within the industry. However, the same is not true for best efforts oflFerings. 
In fact, best efforts offerings managed by submajors are on average offered 
at a greater discount than those managed by regional investment bankers 
who speciahze more in best efforts IPOs. This may be due to the fact that 
preseUing activity is not common in best efforts IPOs, as Welch [16] noted. 
In a best efforts offering, the offer price is set prior to the start of the selling 
period, while the offer price can be revised after information is acquired 
during the pre-selling period in a firm commitment offering. Without the 
information gathered through preselling activity, major and submajor 
investment bankers have no better, if not poorer, ability to estimate the after- 
market price than regional investment bankers.
We divide the IPOs in our sample into two group; the one managed by 
bankers that had not managed a failed offering and the other managed by 
bankers that had managed one or more failed offerings during the sample 
period. Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for these two groups by their 
contract types. It is surprising that the majority of best efforts IPOs are 
managed by bankers with a record of failure. The abihty of an investment 
banker to originate future business does not seem to be devastated by the
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for IPOs By Underwriter Group and by Contract Type 
in the Period 1980-1984 (Standard Deviation in Parenthesis)
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Successfid Offerings Managed 
By Bankers With No Failed 
Best Efforts Offerings
Successful Offerings Managed 
By Bankers With A Record Of 
Failed Best Efforts Offerings
Mean^ Mean
Initial Initial
Contract type Cases Return Proceeds Book Cases Return Proceeds Book
Firm 1,341 9.2 15,882 11,647 110 33.5 3,101 362
Commitment (23.8) (26,192) (46,128) (70.5) (2,048) (866)
Best Efforts 172 31.3 2,766 395 374 46.8 2,315 359
(63.3) (3,458) (801) (85.5) (1,659) (824)
lb  tal 1,513 11.7 14,391 10,654 484 43.8 2,493 360
(31.7) (25,034) (44,159) (82.5) (1,784) (835)
Notes:  ^ All o f the means are averages of nominal values in thousands of US dollars; no price level 
adjustments have been made. For variable definitions, refer to Table 1 and Table 3.
 ^ Among 430 investment bankers that had managed at least one offering in 1980-1984,
127 investment bankers had managed at least one failed offering during the same period.
fact that it had recently managed a failed best efforts offering. This con­
trasts with the finding in Beatty and Ritter [2] that reputation effects seem 
to function in the IPO market. They find that investment bankers pricing 
'off the line' in one subperiod lose market share in the subsequent subpe­
riod, although the relation is a noisy one. Our data shows that many 
regional bankers continue to manage successful offerings, with both firm 
commitment and best efforts contracts, as a lead underwriter even after they 
had recently managed failed best efforts offerings.® This suggests that 
investors, by participating in their future offerings, do not punish these 
investment bankers who brought failed offerings to the market. Or inves­
tors may believe that they have the ability to sort out fairly priced offerings 
from overpriced ones. Also, issuing firms continue to use these regional 
bankers with a record of failed offerings, which suggests these regional 
bankers may be the only ones that are willing to manage their offerings with 
either firm commitment or best efforts contracts.
Both firm commitment and best efforts IPOs managed by bankers with 
no failure record experienced smaller average underpricing than those 
managed by bankers with a record of failure. Notice that the characteristics 
of firm commitment IPOs managed by bankers with a record of failure 
resembles those of best efforts IPOs more closely than those of firm com­
mitment IPOs managed by bankers with no failure record. Also, the aver­
age underpricing of firm commitment IPOs managed by bankers with a
record of failure is even greater than that of best efforts IPOs managed by 
bankers with no failure record. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that issuing firms should attempt to select investment bankers with no fail­
ure record. For some issuing firms, the benefit from guaranteeing the suc­
cess with firm commitment contract may outweigh the cost from greater 
underpricing. Besides, these issuing firms may not have the privilege of 
selecting investment bankers or determining contract type that they desire.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper documents the characteristics of failed best efforts offerings. 
About one fourth of firms that attempted to go public with best efforts offer­
ings failed in the period 1980-1984. If we add the probability of being can­
celed even before an offering becomes effective, the risk of not being able 
to obtain outside financing through an IPO can be substantial. The evi­
dence shows that offerings with greater uncertainty about their true value 
failed more frequently. This is consistent with the implication of Ritter [11], 
Welch [17], or Cho [5] that issuers with greater ex ante price uncertainty, 
due to either greater inherent risk or greater degree of informational asym­
metry, would choose to risk failure. Welch [16] finds a positive relationship 
between underpricing and minimum sales requirement (MSR) which he 
interprets to support the preselling model of Benveniste and Spindt [3]. 
With an updated data, however, we find no significant positive relationship 
between MSR and underpricing. Also, the failure rate is not significantly 
different for offerings with different MSRs. This does not favor the conjec­
ture of Benveniste and Spindt [3] that minimum sales requirements would 
reactivate the incentive of investment banker to presell the entire issue, 
which implies no failure among “all or none” type offerings.
Firm commitment offerings were underwritten by all three groups of 
investment bankers with different reputations; major, submajor, and 
regional investment bankers. Investment bankers enjoying a higher repu­
tation underwrite larger size offerings of more established firms. Also, the 
degree of mispricing was smaller for firm commitment IPOs managed by 
investment bankers with a higher reputation. However, this relationship is 
reversed for best efforts IPOs. While major investment bankers seldom 
managed best efforts IPOs, most best efforts IPOs were m anaged by 
regional investment bankers with minor participation by submajor invest­
ment bankers. Although submajor investment bankers seemed better at 
pricing firm commitment IPOs accurately they were no better than regional 
bankers in their success rate as well as in their pricing ability for best efforts 
IPOs. This may be due to the lack of preselling activity in best efforts offer-
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ings. In firm commitment offerings, investment bankers often revise the 
offer price, using their inform ation about market dem and acquired 
through pre-selhng activities. In best efforts offerings, they set the offer 
price prior to the start of the selhng period. Also, investment bankers with 
a record of failed offerings did not lose their capability of obtaining future 
business, which contrasts with the finding in Beatty and Ritter [2] that 
investment bankers pricing Voff the line' lose market share in the subse­
quent period. In best efforts offerings without pre-selling activity, investors 
may not expect investment bankers to provide certification on their offer­
ings based on their reputation capital. Also, smaller issuing firms with 
greater uncertainty may have no choice over investment bankers other than 
relying on regional investment bankers with a record of recent failed offer­
ings. As a result, it is more likely that the contract choice is determined by 
investment bankers, rather than by these smaller issuing firms.
NOTES
1. Most empirical studies do not even separate these two types of offerings in reporting the 
average initial return. Ritter [10] reports that the average initial return was 14.8% for 
firm commitment /POs and 47.8% for best efforts /POs during 1977-82.
2. For most best efforts offerings, the selling period is 90 days. If the minimum sales 
requirement is not reached within that time, the registration is termed expired and all 
funds deposited in an escrow account must be returned to subscribers. Then, issuing 
firms may either withdraw the registration statement or make a post-effective 
amendment if it wishes to try again. These issuing firms seldom make a post-effective 
amendment within a relatively short span of time.
3. Ritter [10] reports that, of the 155 best efforts /POs that became effective from the 
fourth quarter of 1981 to the third quarter of 1982, 73 offerings were unsuccessful. The 
detailed characteristics of those failed offerings were not provided in his paper
4. Unfortunately, reliable data on the outcome of all best efforts /POs that became effective
after October 1, 1984 is not available. The format of Going Public: The IPO Reporter w2ls 
drastically changed to focus on firm com mitment offerings in 1985 when the 
publication was sold to Dealer's Digest, Our data excluded offerings which did not use 
investment bankers as well as Regulation A offerings for which firms raising less than 
$1.5 million are eligible.
5. The offer price doesn't seem suitable as a proxy for the uncertainty due to outliers that
are mostly unit offerings with offer prices of $100 or more. Out of 546 successful 
offerings, 434 offerings (79.5%) are issued at 1.00 or less per share, while 125 (67.7%) 
out of 186 failed offerings are issued at $1.00 or less per share.
6. The two failed offerings with no minimum sales requirement were included in Table 3. 
They were Gulf American Financial and CADE Industries, both underwritten in 1981 
by the same investment banker. With no minimum sales requirement, these two 
offerings could not fail. The fact that they withdrew their offerings suggests that these 
issuing firms had a certain implicit minimum amount of outside financing from the 
IPOs.
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7. Our classification is based on the relative position o f each investment banker within the
tombstone advertisements appeared in the Wall StreetJournal during the sample period. 
Special bracket bankers are grouped together with major bankers since they usually 
team up with major bankers to manage offerings. Similarly, Carter and Manaster [4] 
assigned an integer rank, zero to nine, for each investment banker in the tombstone 
advertisement according to its position. Our major bankers closely correspond to 
bankers with a ranking of 7.0 or higher, submajor bankers correspond to bankers with 
a ranking between 2.0 and 6.5, and regional bankers correspond to bankers with a 
ranking between 0.0 and 1.5, as assigned by Carter and Manaster.
8. For example, the investment bankers who managed the most (10) failed best efforts IPOs 
successfully managed four firm commitment IPOs and eight best efforts IPOs as a single 
lead underwriter over the same four-year period. The investment banker with the 
second most (five) failed best efforts IPOs successfully managed nine firm commitment 
IPOs and eleven best efforts IPOs over the same four-year period.
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